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Abstract— This paper provides an overview on side-channel 
attacks with emphasis on vulnerabilities in the smart home. Smart 
homes are enabled by the latest developments in sensors, 
communication technologies, internet protocols, and cloud 
services. The goal of a smart home is to have smart household 
devices collaborate without involvement of residents to deliver the 
variety of services needed for a higher quality of life. However, 
security and privacy challenges of smart homes have to be 
overcome in order to fully realize the smart home. Side channel 
attacks assume data is always leaking, and leakage of data from a 
smart home reveals sensitive information. This paper starts by 
reviewing side-channel attack categories, then it gives an overview 
on recent attack studies on different layers of a smart home and 
their malicious goals.  
Keywords— Smart home, Privacy, Side-channel attack 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
As the concept of digitalization becomes a main trend in 
almost every aspect of modern life, promising applications of 
the internet of things (IoT) are becoming tangible and practical, 
from smart phones to smart vehicles and smart living 
environments [1-3]. Thus, the idea of a “smart home” is much 
closer to becoming reality. Initial thoughts about smart homes 
[4-7] have changed in recent years due to significant 
advancement in IoT-enabler technologies, such as sensor 
technology, small-sized and affordable processors, small 
actuators, artificial intelligence techniques, such as machine 
learning and deep learning, cognitive technologies, and cloud 
computing. Researchers and developers are now emphasizing 
the potential of a smart home to improve the quality of human 
life [8]. Already, products and services for smart home 
applications are being developed by companies around the 
world [10]. Despite the desirable qualities offered by a smart 
home, the smart home can also introduce vulnerabilities related 
to security and privacy issues [11], [12]. Generally, people 
spend most of their private moments in their homes. 
Overcoming smart home privacy issues is a critical challenge 
for wide adoption of smart homes. Even if personal information 
is not stolen by adversaries, people still have differing concerns 
about sharing personal information related to in-home activities 
[13].  Thus, having practical and efficient solutions for 
overcoming privacy drawbacks is critical. 
The internet of things uses sensors to collect a large amount 
of data, and all kinds of activities can be detected and recorded 
by a smart home. Due to the large amount of data being 
collected, any type of data leakage can cause unpredictable and 
undesirable consequences. 
Data privacy protection falls into two major categories. The 
first category is protecting sensitive and private content of 
messages transmitted through the home network. Approaches 
in this category mainly use cryptographic techniques [14]. In 
the second category, concerns are about the context of data, 
such as identities of communicators, temporal data, and 
absolute or relative locations of the targeted smart devices. 
Hackers can apply a wide range of side-channel attacks (SCAs) 
on both privacy protection categories to achieve malicious 
aims, such as monitoring hidden in-home activity. In this paper, 
our focus is on SCAs that attack contextual data, i.e. the second 
category, where exchanged data between home appliances is 
not as important as their identities, locations, and functions. Fig. 
1 shows a classification of data privacy and related attacks and 
defenses. 
Fig. 1. Types of data privacy, attack methods, and countermeasure techniques. 
In this paper, our aim is to provide an overview of potential 
threats in smart home. It will aid researchers, developers, 
engineers, and designers in their research or development to 
propose novel solutions and identify other vulnerabilities.   
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows:          
section II describes the   concept of the side-channel attack and 
different types of SCAs, section III introduces SCAs on smart 
 
home systems based on application, and section IV provides a 
conclusion. 
II. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK 
From the physical security point of view, attacks can be 
divided into three classes: invasive, semi-invasive, and non-
invasive. An invasive attack needs physical engagement with 
the device which results in the destruction of the device. An 
example of an invasive attack is using a chemical approach to 
determine the layout of a circuit that results in the loss of 
operation of the circuit. Semi-invasive attacks require physical 
modification to, but not the destruction of, the target device, 
such as opening a package for direct access to the enclosed 
circuits. Non-invasive attacks only utilize externally accessible 
information, such as power consumption, temporal data, or 
network traffic [15].  
The concept of SCAs assumes that data is always leaking, 
which provides the possibility for adversaries to exploit data 
leakage of a smart device to find meaningful correlation 
patterns between events and/or communication nodes. 
Consequently, they will be able to obtain some sensitive private 
data for their malicious misuses [16].   
Considering the attack behavior, there are two types of 
SCAs: passive attacks and active attacks. If an attack only 
exploits the output of a system, for example, monitoring the 
network traffic and analyzing the observations to discover 
desired information, this attack is working passively. On the 
other hand, an active attack starts from system input and 
continues collecting system output, such as an attack that 
provides some predefined events for sensors, then studies the 
response of the device to those events to find secret information 
[15]. Fig. 2 shows the relationship between physical security 
attack and SCAs.  
Fig. 2. Taxonomy of physical security attacks. 
In addition to performing computing tasks, microelectronic 
devices generate physical phenomena that makes them 
vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Each component of a device 
can be subject to one or multiple SCAs. The following are brief 
descriptions of the main types of these attacks: 
A. Timing Analysis: 
A timing analysis investigates the associated timestamps 
assigned to each event, such as packet transmission in a network 
or encoding and decoding operations by a smart device. The 
timing analysis can reveal secret information about the system. 
This attack is useful for global eavesdroppers when they are 
looking for contextual information of a wireless network [17], 
[18]. 
B. Traffic Analysis: 
A traffic analysis involves an attacker that, by monitoring 
all or a part of network traffic, can track data packets, count 
packet number, and record their transmission intervals. This 
analysis is useful when identifying the sender, receiver, or both, 
and spotting their locations is needed [19]. 
C. Electromagnetic Analysis:  
Cryptographic devices performing encryption or decryption 
tasks emit power radiation of electromagnetic fields. In this type 
of attack, adversaries exploit leaked radiation for performing 
electromagnetic analysis to find correlations between leaked 
radiation and ciphertext. Since this radiation can be captured 
remotely, depending on the receiver equipment strength, this 
side-channel attack can be performed from a distance and 
hackers do not need to be close to the target [20]. 
D. Simple Power Analysis (SPA): 
Visual observation of consumed power alterations during 
execution of encryption algorithms enables attackers using a 
simple power analysis to figure out which encryption method is 
being applied on the signal. But existence of various current 
spikes and noises is a challenge for this method [21]. 
E. Differential Power Analysis (DPA): 
Applying statistical error-correcting methods through visual 
data monitoring of electrical power can lead to discovering the 
encryption key through a differential power analysis. Unlike 
SPA, in this approach analysis of power consumption will be 
done on both non-cryptographic operations and cryptographic 
operations, then results will be compared. All cryptographic 
approaches and their hardware are vulnerable to this class of 
SCA [15], [22]. 
F. Fault Analysis: 
Fault analysis injects various types of faults into 
cryptographic devices and analyzes the output of the system. 
[23] states that useful techniques for finding encryption patterns 
involve changing physical conditions of the hardware, such as 
increasing the temperature, injecting fake packets for raising the 
collision likelihood, or applying a laser beam at a particular 
frequency. 
G. Acoustic Analysis: 
Sound produced by electromechanical devices is another 
source for attackers to gain secret information via analysis of 
associated acoustic oscillations. A trained model can be capable 
of distinguishing between sounds that are slightly different. In 
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order to launch this attack, a simple digital sound reordering 
system can be sufficient, such as a smart phone [24], [25]. 
Fig. 3. illustrates an overview on a smart device, its 
components and associated side-channel attacks. 
III. VULNERABLE SMART HOME SYSTEMS 
As one of the most promising applications of the IoT, smart 
homes combine various types of smart systems to provide a 
better domestic life environment through intelligent interaction 
with residents. To develop a smart home, four layers of 
connected automation systems are considered: infrastructure 
layer, ambient condition management layer, application layer, 
and security layer. Systems related to multimedia, household 
appliances, and healthcare monitoring fall into the application 
layer. The ambient condition management layer includes 
systems for controlling temperature, humidity, air freshness, 
and lighting management. The security layer consists of 
different types of access control solutions, such as access cards, 
biometric authentication systems, and surveillance approaches. 
Finally, the infrastructure layer is a group of technologies for 
dealing with energy and water consumption management, such 
as smoke detectors and fire extinguishers. Table 1 provides an 
overview of systems and devices in each layer. This section will 
provide examples of studies done to compromise devices in 
each layer.  
A. Application Layer: 
In a practical experiment by [26], four types of smart TVs 
are investigated to explore possible vulnerabilities. The authors 
managed to successfully modify firmware of a smart TV. They 
discussed three types of firmware analysis techniques: firmware 
updates analysis, physical access, and debugging interfaces. 
Firmware update analysis involves reverse engineering the 
update packages, impersonating the TV, or compromising raw 
binary firmware. In the physical access approach modification 
is enabled by desoldering the memory chip which contains the 
firmware and replacing it with a new chip.  Finally, to debug 
interfaces, serial ports and JTAG interfaces are misused. A 
compromised serial port can give access to the bootloader 
prompt. JTAG interfaces are used for CPU debugging and allow 
flash memory modification. In this experiment, physical access 
to the targeted TV, or access to at least one of the local 
networks, is needed.  
In [27], recognition of the content being watched on TV was 
discerned from the diffusion of light from the screen. The 
authors claim this attack is robust and efficient, and light 
emanation from windows is sufficient to perform their two-
stage approach. First, feature extraction is performed from 
recorded changes in light emission. Second, video retrieval, 
using a pre-computed library of features is extracted from the 
reference content. 
Voice communication is a common activity in every home. 
[28] proposed a novel attack to identify speakers despite 
encrypted voice communication. The authors exploit a 
technique used for reducing voice traffic loads to save 
bandwidth. This technique is called voice activity detection 
(VAD). The authors have shown that using the VAD approach 
generates patterns in encoded network traffic, and traffic 
patterns can be associated with the characteristics of the person 
speaking. 
[29] provides an example of an acoustic side-channel attack 
on printers. In this work, the authors presented a novel attack 
that can recreate English text that is printed by recording the 
sound of the printer during the process. This attack benefits 
from a combination of machine learning, speech recognition, 
and audio processing. They reported that this attack can be 
successful on dot matrix printers, which are still in use in many 
organizations.    
 [30] describes a new side channel attack called PIN 
skimmer that targets mobile computers. This attack is able to 
exploit compromised cameras and microphones installed in the 
smart home to discover entered PINs in soft keyboards. A 
microphone detects the touch event, and data from the camera 
is used to estimate the orientation of the device then correlates 
it to the position of the tapped area on the screen to find the 
related digit.   
In [31], an eavesdropping attack on a wearable device is 
implemented. Researchers were successful in detecting 
physical activity levels based on correlation between sensed in-
home activities and changes in the network traffic, which was 
 
Table 1.  Devices and systems in each layer of a smart home 
measured using the signal strength. They validated their attack 
with real data collected from their wearable prototype. 
 [32] emphasizes privacy threats on smart devices with 
built-in microphones set to be “always on”, for example, smart 
TVs and their voice searching feature or systems using the 
Google Chrome search engine for its ability to passively listen 
for the phrase “OK, Google”. Digital assistants, such as Alexa 
or Siri, are vulnerable in the same way. [33] concentrated on 
smart toys. They can interact with children and, due to their 
connection to the network, they can leak private data through 
online attacks.       
B. Ambient Condition Management Layer: 
In [34], the authors implemented an experiment on Google’s 
Nest. They argued that, since Nest devices send user data to the 
server, intercepting this data can reveal sensitive information. 
They state it can even be done by a script kiddie attack (shared 
malicious scripts developed by sophisticated hackers, 
performed by beginner hackers). Due to credential leakage, 
hackers can take the full control of the device. They suggested 
that, instead of performing learning algorithms on the server 
side, the attack can be performed locally by each individual 
device, and Nest is powerful enough to perform a simple 
learning algorithm. 
In another study on Google’s Nest, [35] managed to install 
malicious software by bypassing firmware verification of the 
device. As a result, the attacker gains access to all available 
information stored on the memory. Moreover, attackers can 
change the behavior of the compromised device and use it to 
perform similar attacks on other devices within the local 
network.  
In yet another work on Google’s Nest [36], the Nest smoke 
and carbon dioxide detectors are exploited to detect home 
occupancy. This work shows how it is possible to achieve a high 
accuracy rate by performing a traffic analysis attack, even if the 
data is encrypted.   
Zigbee Light Link (ZLL), a low power network, is designed 
to be used by smart lighting systems. [37] introduced a novel 
attack on smart homes that use this system to take full control 
of the system after bypassing all pre-designed security defense 
considerations. They tested three popular smart lighting 
systems: Osram Litify, Philips Hue, and GE Link, and all of 
them are vulnerable to this attack.  
In research conducted by [38], vulnerability of visual light 
communication (VLC) is investigated. VLC is considered to be 
secure from eavesdropping attacks, because, unlike radio 
waves, light cannot pass through walls. However, the authors 
showed that a small gap under a door, keyholes, and covered 
windows can be enough for an attacker to intercept and decode 
the message packets, even outside of the direct beam. Captured 
traffic can then be used for timing or traffic analysis attacks. 
C. Security Layer 
 [39] investigates a video surveillance system. The authors 
reported that difference coding, which is a highly efficient 
approach for compressing video streams, causes data leakage. 
Encrypted compressed video shows distinguishable changes in 
traffic patterns that can be correlated with basic in-home 
activities. When there is no video stream being transferred, the 
size of an encrypted data stream is much smaller than that when 
there is a stream. Authors performed experiments to show that 
activities such as styling hair, moving, and eating are detectable 
with high accuracy.  
Another work is focused on security of smart locks. Authors 
investigated number of available smart locks in the market: 
Kevo, August, Dana, Okidokeys and Lockiton. Most of these 
locks are using device-gateway-cloud (DGC) architecture. 
Based on the working mechanism of these devices, two classes 
of attacks are introduced: revocation evasion and access log 
evasion. All tested smart locks have an option to revoke other 
user’s access by the owners.  This feature can be exploited in a 
revocation evasion. However, these devices have access 
logging features to inform owners of unauthorized access. The 
logging feature can be overcome with an access log evasion, 
where the attacker prevents the recording process [40]. 
 
D.  Infrastructure Layer 
[41] showed that service providers can exploit power 
consumption levels to enhance their services. However, these 
 
data can also reveal in-home activity patterns. To investigate 
the effects of this privacy attack, they implement an attack 
known as non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NIALM) to 
discover how privacy of energy consumption data can be 
preserved while still providing services. To address this issue, 
they proposed a masking approach where the smart meter 
masks data then sends it to the provider. In order to be effective, 
this masking should not affect the outcome of the aggregating 
operations.  
Table 2. Smart home systems attack overview 
In another work, the possibility of private in-home activity 
recognition is demonstrated. A NIALM attack is used to reveal 
private activities, such as how much one sleeps, when one 
leaves for work, if a child is home alone, and whether one’s 
breakfast is hot or cold. The proposed solution is called zero-
knowledge (ZK) billing protocol, consisting of three steps: 
registration, tuple gathering, and reconciliation. Moreover, a 
formulated leakage model is presented to ensure adequate 
privacy [42].  
In [43], the authors performed a layered hidden Markov 
model (LHMM) to discover whether it is possible to deduce 
activities of daily living (ADL) from patterns of associated 
power consumption. They found that all ADLs are not 
detectable with this attack due to low sample size for some 
activities, such as washing dishes or using air exhaust. To 
overcome this problem, they proposed a hierarchical Dirichlet 
process hidden Markov model (HDP-HMM) to model the 
emission probability with a mixture of gaussian distributions 
and demonstrated that this method perform better than other 
models in detecting ADLS.  
In [44], the authors conducted an experiment to demonstrate 
occupancy detection by performing a common classification 
technique based on data gathered by network-connected energy 
meter equipment. The authors found that, by considering 
features such as mean, standard deviation, and sum of the 
absolute differences of each power phase, it is possible to 
achieve to up to 80% accuracy in determining home occupancy.   
 [45] designed a framework called MTPlug using supervised 
machine learning techniques. This attack aims to detect laptop-
users by exploiting power consumption data collected from 
either household level sensors or wall-socket level sensors. 
Results show that they can reach to up to 80% accuracy in a 
relatively short time. This laptop energy trace can lead to 
privacy threats, for example identification or position tracking.  
A fingerprint and timing-based snooping (FATS) attack 
aims to reveal in-home activities using timing analysis. By 
logging fingerprints and associated timestamps of 
communication from each wireless device, the attack performs 
a four-tier classification to identify each device, its location, and 
its function. Therefore, each action in the home is exposed to 
attackers. [46] introduced this attack, and [47], [48] have shown 
potential solutions to this attack.  
Attacks discussed in this section are summarized in Table 2. 
The table is organized based on the system under attack and the 
goal of the attack. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of smart homes affects various aspects of a 
user’s life. They will be monitored by a number of sensors, 
including cameras, microphones, motion detectors, and activity 
loggers. All of these systems are intended to provide useful 
services for a better quality of life; however, they also increase 
privacy concerns due to data leakage. In this paper, we provided 
an insight of how adversaries can use side-channel attacks to 
exploit smart home vulnerabilities. We discussed the 
significance of privacy issues in smart home environments and 
how vulnerable they are to side-channel attacks. Seven major 
types of SCAs were introduced, and a review on recent privacy 
attacks on different aspects of smart home systems was 
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